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JURISPRUDENCE AND JURISDICTION:
TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO
BANKRUPTCY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
Kristin D. Kiehn*
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy law not only determines the rights of individual litigants
in any given case or proceeding, but it regulates the commercial sec-
tor, the operation of businesses, and the financial relationships be-
tween people.' Yet despite its fundamental importance in our
society, bankruptcy law today is riddled with lack of uniformity3 and
plagued by a much-criticized appellate system.'
In 1984, Congress overhauled the structure of the bankruptcy courts
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,' which declared the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional.6 The changes in-
cluded a revision of appellate procedures relating to bankruptcy court
rulings.7 The 1984 amendments produced 28 U.S.C. §158(a),8 which
governs interlocutory appeals between bankruptcy courts and district
courts. The statute grants district courts discretion to hear interlocu-
tory appeals from bankruptcy court rulings, but provides no statutory
standard for those courts to consider in determining whether to grant
leave to appeal.9 This absence has forced district courts and Bank-
* My kindest thanks to: James Bernard, Esq., gallant topic-vendor and patient
mentor, Professor Marc M. Arkin, for her insightful comments and assistance in all
things; Professor Carl Felsenfeld, for reading a draft of this Note; my parents, Timothy
and Wendy, for their endless love and good cheer, and Anne M. McCarthy, for the
abundance of moral support. In memoriam Dorothy and Grace.
1. See Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein, Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of
Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 Am. Bankr. L.J. 525, 537-38 (1995)
("Because the commercial lending markets are national in scope, a decision by a
bankruptcy judge in one state affects the practices of lenders not only in that state but
throughout the country."); Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Fur-
ther Reply to Professor Chemerinsky, 71 Am. Bankr. L.J. 137, 145 (1997) (noting that
bankruptcy litigation governs "contract disputes, landlord-tenant rights, the interpre-
tation of the Uniform Commercial Code, criminal acts, marital breakups and financial
responsibility for children").
2. See Crabb, supra note 1, at 145.
3. See Lissa Lamkin Broome, Comment, Bankruptcy Appeals: The Wheel Is
Come Full Circle, 69 Am. Bankr. LJ. 541, 541-43 (1995).
4. See Crabb, supra note 1, at 139-41.
5. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
6. See id. at 87; Melodie Freeman-Burney, Note, Jurisdiction Under the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments of 1984: Summing Up the Factors, 22 Mlsa LJ. 167, 179 (1986).
7. See Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.03, at 3-165 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1996).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988) (amended 1994). The current law relating to discre-
tionary interlocutory appeals is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
9. See id. § 158(a)(3).
3261
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
ruptcy Appellate Panels ("BAPs") to develop their own criteria for
deciding whether to hear appeals from bankruptcy interim orders.
This Note addresses the widespread adoption by district courts of 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) as a surrogate standard.' ° Section 1292(b) is the
standard that district courts and courts of appeals are required to use
when deciding whether to permit interlocutory appeals from district
court rulings." This Note argues that while § 1292(b) offers an analyt-
ical starting point, a more flexible approach to its use is warranted in
the bankruptcy context.
Part I of this Note discusses the final judgment rule governing liti-
gants' ability to appeal as of right, and lays out several exceptions to
the finality requirement. In particular, part I defines the jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals to hear interlocutory appeals via 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), the standard adopted by most district courts in the absence
of a statutory standard in the bankruptcy context. Part I details the
criteria set forth in § 1292(b) that district courts and courts of appeals
must apply in considering whether to grant leave to appeal. In addi-
tion, this part discusses the criticisms levied against a strict application
of the terms of § 1292(b) in the district court-court of appeals context,
and outlines the arguments for a more flexible application of the stat-
ute in its ordinary context. Part II of this Note defines the jurisdiction
of the bankruptcy courts in light of the Marathon decision, and de-
scribes the nature of bankruptcy litigation. Part II then focuses on the
flexible approach to finality in bankruptcy for purposes of automatic
appeal, and provides an overview of the current bankruptcy appellate
structure. Part III analyzes the approaches district courts and BAPs
have adopted in the absence of a clearly defined statutory standard for
hearing interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy court rulings. This
part demonstrates that while most courts have transported the criteria
outlined in § 1292(b) as a surrogate standard, some courts have
adopted a more flexible approach. Part IV argues that this more flexi-
ble approach to hearing bankruptcy interlocutory appeals is appropri-
ate. Part IV recommends that a district court or BAP ground its
analysis in § 1292(b), but that it not be limited by a rote application of
that provision's terms absent a statutory mandate. Such a pragmatic,
flexible approach to granting leave to appeal interim rulings empha-
sizes the unique concerns of bankruptcy litigants, and ensures that jus-
tice is served even when the appeal does not otherwise satisfy the
criteria of § 1292(b).
I. INTERLOCUTORY Appeals
This part defines the final judgment rule governing litigants' right to
appeal and discusses the policy bases underlying the rule. It then de-
10. See id. § 1292(b).
11. See id.
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scribes the various exceptions to the finality requirement, most nota-
bly interlocutory appeals.
A. The Finality Requirement for Appeals Generally
Appeals from trial court rulings to appellate courts are generally
confined to final decisions and judgments. 12 Final decisions and judg-
ments are those that effectively end the litigation on the merits, re-
quiring no further action by the court below save entering an order of
judgment.'3 This requirement of finality serves several purposes. Re-
quiring that litigants wait to appeal until a final judgment has been
entered ensures that the litigation will proceed without undue inter-
ruption. 4 Consolidating all grounds for appeal into one tidy package
serves the goals of judicial efficiency.' Thus, the final judgment rule
allows the appellate court a more complete record from which to work
in considering the merits of an appeal, 6 and avoids leading to the issu-
ance of advisory opinions.' 7 The necessity for review may also disap-
pear if later proceedings render the appealed issue moot.'" In
addition, affording deference to a trial judge's interim findings of law
and fact promotes respect for and independence of trial judges.' 9
§ Accordingly, appeals from nonfinal judgments are heavily restricted,
reflecting these policies against disruptive, piecemeal litigation.
Appeals from final rulings of federal district courts to the courts of
appeals are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291.20 Section 1291 incorpo-
rates the legislative policy in favor of limiting review to final judg-
ments and orders."' The statute has been interpreted as forbidding
appeal unless the order sought to be appealed from "ends the litiga-
tion on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment."' Courts have noted in the federal context that the
final judgment rule promotes a "healthy legal system,"'  and that the
12. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 85, at 708 (1995) (noting that an order's
appealability is a jurisdictional requirement).
13. See id. § 87, at 710.
14. See id. § 86, at 709.
15. See id.
16. See id. (stating that the finality requirement prevents appellate courts from
speculating on issues yet to be developed below).
17. See Green v. Brantley, 895 F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 941 F.2d 1146 (11th Cir. 1991).
18. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995).
19. See Firestone ire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) ("The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... ").
21. See Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 ("The statute recognizes that rules that permit
too many interlocutory appeals can cause harm."); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (noting that the effect of § 1291 is to "disallow appeal
from any decision which is tentative, informal or incomplete").
22. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)).
23. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 326 (1940).
1999] 3263
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
policy concerns behind the rule apply even in the face of substantial
costs. 24 While Congress and the courts have developed limited excep-
tions to the finality requirement, these exceptions are generally disfa-
vored and narrowly construed.
B. Exceptions to the Finality Requirement
1. Judicial and Statutory Exceptions
There are judicial and statutory exceptions to the finality require-
ment that allow litigants to automatically appeal, as of right, certain
interim orders. These exceptions exist apart from discretionary inter-
locutory appeals, which will be discussed in the next section. Under
the judicially created collateral order doctrine, "final" decisions on
matters collateral, or tangential, to the main cause of action are ap-
pealable under the theory that § 1291 allows appeal from all "final
decisions. '26 This doctrine was developed before passage of the stat-
ute permitting interlocutory appeals, 7 and resulted from a recognition
that some orders could be effectively reviewed only at an earlier stage
in the litigation.' The Supreme Court has set forth a three-pronged
test to identify matters that can be appropriately appealed under the
collateral order doctrine: the order must (1) conclusively determine
the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment.29 Although the doctrine developed
in response to the rigid requirements of the final judgment rule, it is
nonetheless strictly construed and applied to only a "small class" of
cases.
30
Other exceptions to the finality rule include the death knell and
Forgay-Conrad doctrines. The death knell doctrine, developed by sev-
24. See Green v. Brantley, 895 F.2d 1387, 1392 (11th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 941 F.2d 1146 (11th Cir. 1991).
25. See Metallgesellschaft A.G. v. MV Capitan Constante, 790 F.2d 280, 283 (2d
Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, J., dissenting) (noting that despite the legislative enactment and
judicial development of exceptions to the finality rule, "[i]t is axiomatic that litigants
must ordinarily wait for final resolution of all issues submitted to a federal court
before they can enforce a judgment or obtain appellate review").
26. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 113, at 734 (1995). The collateral order
doctrine was set forth by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), in which the Court gave § 1291 a "practical rather than a
technical" interpretation. Id. at 546. The Court noted that orders qualifying under the
collateral order doctrine are "too important to be denied review and too independent
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole
case is adjudicated." Id.
27. See Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994)); infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
28. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y., 662 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1981).
29. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
30. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
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eral circuit courts,31 permits review of orders that would terminate a
cause of action if otherwise left unreviewed.32 Applying this doctrine
requires the court to consider the plaintiff's incentive to continue the
litigation if the appeal is denied.33 The Supreme Court has criticized
the doctrine as an authorization of indiscriminate interlocutory review
of trial court decisions.' Under the Forgay-Conrad doctrine, a court
order compelling a defendant to return allegedly fraudulently ob-
tained property is immediately appealable.35 This doctrine focuses on
the chance of irreparable harm to the losing party if forced to await
the final outcome of the litigation. 6
Congress has also enacted exceptions to the finality rule that are
embodied in § 1292(a)-interlocutory orders relating to the grant or
denial of injunctions, receiverships, and admiralty claims.37 Orders of
these types are automatically appealable as of right, reflecting a legis-
lative judgment that the overall benefits to be gained from immediate
review outweigh the policies against piecemeal appeals. 31 In addition,
the availability of mandamus review39 and the ability of a district court
to declare a ruling final in a multi-claim proceeding under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)40 offer alternative, yet equally narrow,
means of circumventing the final judgment rule.4 Barring these few
narrow exceptions, a litigant seeking to appeal a nonfinal order bears
31. See, e.g., Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1971) (permitting ap-
peal from an order delaying action until plaintiff-prisoner was released from prison);
Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1967) (allowing appeal
from an interlocutory order refusing an injunction); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103,
105-06 (4th Cir. 1967) (granting leave to appeal from an order staying proceedings
pending termination of similar proceedings in another court); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jac-
quelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966) (permitting appeal of dismissal of class
action).
32. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 114, at 737 (1995).
33. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 471.
34. See id. at 474-75 (rejecting appealability of denial of class certification under
the death knell doctrine).
35. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 115, at 738-39 (citing Forgay v. Conrad,
47 U.S. 201 (1848)).
36. See Growth Realty Cos. v. Regency Woods Apartments, Ltd. (In re Regency
Woods Apartments, Ltd.), 686 F.2d 899, 902 (11th Cir. 1982).
37. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)-(3) (1994).
38. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1995).
39. See id. at 310.
40. See id.; see also Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218,
1219-20 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that the rule should be invoked when there is no just
reason for delay, and that a district court's intent to declare the order final must be
crystalline).
41. See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947) (stating that the remedy of
mandamus is drastic and extraordinary); Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642
F.2d 614, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that Fed. R. Civ. p. 54(b) is a means of deter-
mining when an order is final, and thus is not really an exception to the final judgment
rule).
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the burden of establishing a right to a discretionary interlocutory
appeal.42
2. Interlocutory Appeals
An interlocutory appeal is one taken from a judge's interim ruling
in a matter. Such rulings do not typically dispose of the overall merits
of an action, but rather involve intermediate rulings that affect the
future course of the litigation.43 The federal statute governing discre-
tionary interlocutory appeals from district courts to the courts of ap-
peals is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).44 Prior to the enactment of § 1292(b),
there was no federal statute permitting discretionary interlocutory ap-
peals between district courts and courts of appeals.45 Congress en-
acted § 1292(b) in 195846 in response to the perceived harm to
litigants from orders incapable of being corrected on appeal from a
final judgment, and due to displeasure with prolonged litigation that
frequently ensued from a party's inability to appeal immediately.47
The statute's language was intended as a compromise between those
who desired expanded interlocutory appellate jurisdiction for the
courts of appeals and those who wanted no such jurisdiction
whatsoever.48
42. Critics of the current federal interlocutory appellate system have turned to an
approach adopted in Wisconsin that is based on an American Bar Association propo-
sal. See Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: Right
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 717, 788 (1993) (advocating that the
courts of appeals consider adopting the Wisconsin approach); John C. Nagel, Note,
Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence with Discretionary
Review, 44 Duke L.J. 200, 201 (1994) (same). This proposal eliminates all judicially
created exceptions to the final judgment rule (e.g., the collateral order doctrine), and
divides interlocutory appeals into two categories: a broad category of appeals in
which appellate courts would retain discretion to grant leave based on the circum-
stances of each case, and a narrow category of specific types of orders that would be
labeled presumptively appealable or nonappealable. See Nagel, supra, at 214-15, 229
(arguing that broad discretionary review "would provide the courts with the flexible
power needed to respond to requests for interlocutory appeals"); see also Martineau,
supra, at 777 ("The discretionary appeal thus provides the relief valve in those cases in
which strict adherence to the final judgment rule would not serve the best interests of
the parties or the public, but with an individualized balancing of interests made on a
case by case basis.").
43. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 87, at 710-12 (1995).
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
45. Prior to 1891, no federal interlocutory appeals were available whatsoever. See
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 753 (3d Cir. 1974). Exceptions to this
prohibition were later enacted for orders relating to injunctions, receiverships, admi-
ralty claims, and patent infringements. See id.
46. See Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770.
47. See Katz, 496 F.2d at 753-54 (detailing the legislative history of § 1292(b)).
48. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal
Courts, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1165, 1171-72 (1990) (noting that a prior proposal had
called for permissive appeal when "necessary or desirable to avoid substantial injus-
tice" (quoting Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the Proceedings of
a Special Session 203 (1952))); see also Katz, 496 F.2d at 754 ("[S]ection [1292(b)]
probably was intended to include orders having.., potential for harm to the litigant
3266 [Vol. 67
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An appeal under § 1292(b) must first be certified by the district
judge, who must indicate that the order satisfies a three-pronged test:
the order sought to be appealed from (1) presents a controlling ques-
tion of law, (2) as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion, and (3) an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.' 9 If the interlocu-
pendente lite or... potential for causing a wasted protracted trial if it could early be
determined that there might be no liability."). In the years immediately following
passage of the statute, statistics showed that interlocutory appeals were certified
under § 1292(b) approximately 100 times per year, and that about half of the applica-
tions were granted by the courts of appeals. See 16 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction of the Courts of Appeals
§ 3929, at 363 (1996) [hereinafter Wright & Miller] (concluding that passage of
§ 1292(b) had not significantly expanded interim appeals). More recent statistics
show that in the 1980s, while the number of certifications doubled, the number ac-
cepted by the courts of appeals hovered around 35%. See Solimine, supra, at 1174-75.
Professor Solimine notes that interlocutory appeals comprise just over 10% of pro-
ceedings in federal appellate courts. See id. at 1166.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The requirement that the order involve a controlling
question of law is meant to ensure that the issue on appeal is one central to the case,
though it need not be dispositive. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 125, at 750-51
(1995). To qualify, some argue that the issue presented should constitute reversible
error. See id. But see Katz, 496 F.2d at 755 (noting that the legislative history of
§ 1292(b) suggests that the order need not necessarily constitute reversible error, and
that "controlling" is better interpreted to mean "serious to the conduct of the litiga-
tion, either practically or legally"); 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3930, at 426
(noting that the better approach is to find a question controlling "if interlocutory
reversal might save time for the district court, and time and expense for the liti-
gants"). The criterion that a substantial ground for difference of opinion exist limits
appellate access to resolution of uncertain legal questions when the relevant circuit
has not ruled on a particular issue. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 128, at 753-54
(stating that other appropriate instances may include a ruling contrary to those
reached by the courts of appeals, foreign law questions, and novel legal issues of first
impression). Wright and Miller argue that the degree of conflict should be adjusted
according to the importance of the question in the individual case. See 16 Wright &
Miller, supra note 48, § 3930, at 422. The necessity that resolving the issue on appeal
now, rather than later, may materially advance the litigation aims at avoiding a
lengthy trial or further proceedings if possible. See Katz, 496 F.2d at 755; 16 Wright &
Miller, supra note 48, § 3930, at 432-34 (noting that appeal should be denied if "there
is a good prospect that the certified question may be mooted by further proceedings,
if the character of the trial is not likely to be affected, or if an essentially collateral
matter such as attorney fees is involved" (footnotes omitted)). Section 1292(b) reads
in full:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order in-
volves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state
in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdic-
tion of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an
appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That [sic] application
for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
3267
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tory order is so certified, the court of appeals retains ultimate discre-
tion to decide whether or not to hear the appeal.50 The requirement
that both the district court and the court of appeals approve the in-
terim appeal acts as a double screening device against wasteful and
improper appeals.51
Section 1292(b)'s criteria, if applied rigidly, are particularly oner-
ous, reflecting the policy against piecemeal review of interim orders,
which can lead to protracted litigation and judicial inefficiency.52
Courts and commentators generally urge that leave to appeal under
§ 1292(b) be granted sparingly, in keeping with the policy of discour-
aging disruption in the adjudicative process. 3 On the other hand, the
rights of the parties may demand interlocutory review. 4 For instance,
review may be warranted when a trial court's error can be quickly
corrected, when the subsequent proceedings can be clarified or
streamlined, or when parties can potentially conclude their role in the
litigation altogether.
C. Criticisms of a Strict Application of § 1292(b)
Some have suggested that while courts pay lip service to the strin-
gent requirements of § 1292(b), interlocutory appeals are sometimes
heard that would not otherwise meet the three-pronged test set out in
the statute. 6 These commentators advocate this more flexible ap-
proach, viewing a restrictive, literal application of § 1292(b) as archaic
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463,
475 & n.26 (1978) (holding that appellate courts may deny appeal for "any reason,
including docket congestion," and citing legislative history likening their authority to
the Supreme Court's ability to deny certiorari); Katz, 496 F.2d at 754 (interpreting the
legislative history of § 1292(b) to allow courts of appeal to deny leave for reasons
entirely unrelated to the three certification criteria, including an overcrowded appel-
late docket or the desire for a full and complete record before ruling).
51. See Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 474-75.
52. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 118; see also McGillicuddy v. Clements,
746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[I]nterlocutory certification under ... § 1292(b)
should be used sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances, and where the pro-
posed intermediate appeal presents one or more difficult and pivotal questions of law
not settled by controlling authority."); Span East Airlines, Inc. v. Digital Equip.
Corp.. 486 F. Supp. 831, 834 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting that district court certification is
not a routine act).
53. See, e.g., White v. Nix, 43 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It has.., long been
the policy of the courts to discourage piece-meal appeals because most often such
appeals result in additional burdens on both the court and the litigants." (citation
omitted)); State ex rel. Howes v. W.R. Peele, Sr. Trust, 889 F. Supp. 849, 852
(E.D.N.C. 1995) (stating that "Congress intended that § 1292(b) be applied spar-
ingly"); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 118, at 743 (noting that discretionary review
is "designed for exceptional cases where a decision on appeal may avoid protracted
and expensive litigation" (footnote omitted)).
54. See 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 87, at 712.
55. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309-10 (1995).
56. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3929, at 368. Wright and Miller quote
Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A. as an example of the approach many courts take in
practice:
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and needlessly limiting.5 7 They urge instead a more pragmatic analy-
sis that would evolve through the judicial process, drawing upon
judges' ability to interpret legislation that they themselves inspired
and helped to pass.5" Further, they suggest that the possible negative
effects of increased appeals, including appellate docket congestion,
can be eased by equally modest reductions in full-scale briefing, oral
argument, and lengthy appellate opinions.5 9 Concerns about the re-
duced legitimacy of district court rulings are overstated, these com-
mentators observe, because the majority of interlocutory appeals
result in affirmances, thus in fact buttressing respect for district
courts.60 In addition, delays in proceedings will be offset by the poten-
tial for termination of litigation altogether.61
According to this rationale, a more lenient attitude toward interloc-
utory appeals facilitates clarification of issues that frequently fail to
reach appellate courts due to the overwhelming number of cases that
terminate before appeal.6" By analyzing individual cases, guided by
the criteria of § 1292(b), courts can effectively determine which ap-
[T]here are occasions which defy precise delineation or description in which
as a practical matter orderly administration is frustrated by the necessity of a
waste of precious judicial time while the case grinds through to a final judg-
ment as the sole medium through which to test the correctness of some iso-
lated identifiable point of fact, of law, of substance or procedure, upon which
in a realistic way the whole case or defense will turn.... It is that general
approach... that should guide us ....
Id. (citing Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697,702-03 (5th Cir. 1961)); see also
Solimine, supra note 48, at 1196-1201 (conducting survey that showed that while most
§ 1292(b) appeals were certified after qualifying under the three-pronged test, many
represented "ordinary, routine" matters).
57. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3929, at 370 ("[A] flexible approach
to § 1292(b) is far superior to blind adherence to a supposed need to construe strictly
any permission to depart from the final judgment rule. The statute is not limited by
its language to 'exceptional' cases." (footnote omitted)); Solimine, supra note 48, at
1193.
58. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3929, at 370-71 (arguing that
§ 1292(b) should be used as a broad judicial device to limit expansion of other appeal-
ability concepts, and even to replace exceptions to the finality requirement such as the
collateral order doctrine). Wright and Miller favor using the criteria in § 1292(b) as
guiding principles, and worry that rote application of the test by some courts stymies
the potential for more flexible analyses by other courts. See id. § 3930, at 415-16. Pro-
fessor Solimine urges a similar approach, calling for a modest expansion of interlocu-
tory appeals and the abandonment of § 1292(b)'s three-pronged test as an exclusive
measure of appealability. See Solimine, supra note 48, at 1193. Professor Solimine
notes that the benefits of interlocutory appeals include the opportunity to save costs
and time via immediate correction of a ruling, the ability of circuit courts to supervise
trial courts more effectively, the fact that complex, multi-party litigation can move
forward while discrete issues are settled on appeal, and the chance for rulings impor-
tant to the public or other cases to be issued without delay. See id. at 1169, 1176.
59. See Solimine, supra note 48, at 1178.
60. See id at 1178-79.
61. See id at 1179-80.
62. See id at 1213.
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peals warrant a hearing, and which would constitute a waste of judicial
time and resources.63
Despite these criticisms of a narrow application of § 1292(b) by dis-
trict courts and courts of appeals, the statutory mandate is typically a
burdensome one, and litigants face a difficult road in obtaining leave
to appeal an interlocutory order.' The strict application of § 1292(b)
is particularly significant in the context of bankruptcy interlocutory
appeals, in which many courts have chosen to apply § 1292(b) in a
similarly literal fashion in the absence of any statutory standard what-
soever.65 The next part provides a brief summary of bankruptcy pro-
cedure and the bankruptcy appellate process, highlighting the
confusion and uncertainty governing many areas of bankruptcy
adjudication.
II. BANKRUPTCY AND ITS APPELLATE STRUCTURE
This part defines the jurisdictional relationship between bankruptcy
courts and district courts and examines the unique nature of bank-
ruptcy litigation. It then describes the flexible approach to the final
judgment rule in the bankruptcy context and sets forth the structure
governing the bankruptcy appellate process.
A. The Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts
Congress is empowered by the United States Constitution to estab-
lish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."'66 The bankruptcy statutory scheme was overhauled
by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (the "Act").67 The primary
63. See id. at 1204-05 (arguing that § 1292(b) can operate as a "safety valve"
against the floodgates of appeal, aided by the double screening device of district court
certification and appellate permission, but noting that in any event, § 1292(b) is cur-
rently underused). Similarly, Wright and Miller state:
Ideally, § 1292(b) could be used to allow interlocutory appeals whenever the
district court and court of appeals agree that immediate review is a good
gamble. The difficulty and general importance of the question presented,
the probability of reversal, the significance of the gains from reversal, and
the hardship on the parties in their particular circumstances, could all be
considered.
16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3930, at 442.
64. See, e.g., McGillicuddy v. Clements, 746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting
that courts should allow appeal under § 1292(b) "sparingly and only in exceptional
circumstances"); 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 118, at 743 (1995) ("Because of the
strong policy against piecemeal review, statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals are
to be strictly construed and do not leave the courts totally free to decide which inter-
locutory orders are appealable." (footnotes omitted)).
65. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
66. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 4.
67. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11 and 28 U.S.C. (1994)). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544
(repealed 1978), federal district courts exercised exclusive jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy proceedings, but exerted jurisdiction over controversies only if subject matter
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thrust of the Act was to confer wide jurisdictional powers upon bank-
ruptcy judges to hear and decide all cases and proceedings arising
under title 11 of the United States Code.68 This grant of authority to
bankruptcy courts was not limited to bankruptcy cases generally, but
included all related proceedings arising in the adjudication, including
state-law claims.69
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
the Supreme Court found this grant of authority to non-Article HI
judges unconstitutional.70 The Court held that granting bankruptcy
judges, who functioned as adjuncts to the district courts, jurisdiction
over state-law claims unrelated to the bankruptcy proceeding was an
unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction over non-federally-created
rights.7 ' In response to the Marathon decision, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.1
District courts now exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy "cases,17 3 along with original jurisdiction over civil "pro-
ceedings" arising in or related to bankruptcy cases.74 Bankruptcy
courts continue to function as units of the district courts,"s and district
courts accordingly possess the power to refer cases to bankruptcy
judges,76 as well as to withdraw the reference.' If the case is so re-
jurisdiction, via diversity or a federal question, was satisfied. See Freeman-Burney,
supra note 6, at 171. "Proceedings" comprised the bankruptcy adjudications them-
selves, while "controversies" referred to claims and suits by and against third parties
that related to the bankruptcy estate. See id. at 170. Bankruptcy "referees," created
by the 1898 Act, presided over bankruptcy cases in federal courts, obtaining more and
more responsibility as time passed, until their titles were officially changed to bank-
ruptcy "judges" in 1973. See id at 171. For a brief history of bankruptcy statutes prior
to the 1978 Act, see id at 169-72.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1978) (repealed by the 1984 Amendments); 16 Wright
& Miller, supra note 48, § 3926, at 240.
69. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,85
(1982).
70. See id at 87. Article III judges, pursuant to the "good Behaviour" Clause of
the United States Constitution, possess life tenure and are subject to removal only by
impeachment. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; see Marathon, 458 U.S. at 59. Bankruptcy
judges under the 1978 Act, by contrast, were appointed to 14-year terms, subject to
removal by the judicial council of each circuit, and vulnerable to statutory salary fluc-
tuations. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 53.
71. See Marathon, 458 U.S. at 84. For a more detailed discussion of the Marathon
decision, see Freeman-Burney, supra note 6, at 172-77.
72. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
11, 28 U.S.C. (1994)). For an in-depth history of bankruptcy jurisdiction, see Jeffrey
T. Ferriell, Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, 63 Am. Bankr. LJ. 109, 113-21 (1989).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (1994). Bankruptcy "cases" refers broadly to those cases
"commenced when a petition for relief under title 11 is filed, [and which] encom-
pass[ ] all the controversies as well as all matters of administration involved in liquida-
tion or reorganization under title 11." Freeman-Bumey, supra note 6, at 180.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
75. See id. § 151; Bertoli v. D'Avella (In re Bertoli), 812 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir.
1987).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
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ferred, bankruptcy judges may hear and make all final determinations
in core proceedings78 under title 11. 79 As for noncore proceedings,80
bankruptcy judges submit proposed findings and conclusions to the
district courts, and district judges exercise de novo review over those
findings.81
B. The Nature of Bankruptcy
The purpose of bankruptcy adjudication is to administer a ratable
distribution of the debtor's assets between creditors and other claim-
ants.8" Bankruptcy allows an eligible debtor access to an orderly ad-
ministration of debt, relieving the debtor from collection attempts and
other suits through the mechanism of the automatic stay,83 and afford-
ing the debtor a "fresh start" after liquidation84 or a chance to reduce
77. See id. § 157(d); In re Bertoli, 812 F.2d at 139.
78. Core proceedings are those central to administration of the bankruptcy estate,
such as matters relating to the automatic stay and creditors' claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2); David G. Knibb, Federal Court of Appeals Manual § 14.1, at 232 (3d ed.
1997), see also S. Elizabeth Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Com-
mands of Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 967, 1007 (1988)
(noting that rather than define "core proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) merely pro-
vides a nonexclusive list of matters covered by the term).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
80. Noncore proceedings encompass matters peripheral to the bankruptcy adjudi-
cation, or the parties thereto, but not central to its administration. See Susan Block-
Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J.
529, 546-50 (1998) (discussing the uncertainty pervading the distinction between core
and noncore proceedings, and noting that at the very least, noncore proceedings in-
clude those arising solely under state law and brought by a trustee or debtor-in-pos-
session against a third party-the cause of action at issue in Marathon).
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1); see also Bertain v. Mitchell (In re Bertain), 215 B.R.
438, 441 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (noting that while bankruptcy courts' conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo, findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard); Knibb, supra note 78, § 14.1, at 233 (noting that district courts typically
accept the bankruptcy judge's conclusions). For a brief overview of the procedures
relating to bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction, see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and
Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1063, 1065-71
(1994).
82. See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R. Griffith, Presumed Indigent: The Effect
of Bankruptcy on a Debtor's Sixth Amendment Right to Criminal Defense Counsel, 62
UMKC L. Rev. 277, 301 (1993) ("[T]he present American bankruptcy system is a
treatment for financial illness."); Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the
Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 3
(1986).
83. The automatic stay goes into effect upon filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994). The stay operates in part to foreclose all creditors' attempts
to collect on outstanding debts, requiring instead that they submit their claims to the
bankruptcy court for adjudication. See Medicar Ambulance Co. v. Shalala (In re
Medicar Ambulance Co.), 166 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the
automatic stay prevents a "race to the courthouse" (quoting David A. Skeel, Markets,
Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 465).
84. Chapter 7 allows a trustee to liquidate all of the debtor's assets as of the date
of filing and distribute them to the claimants in order of priority, thus earning the
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or pay off debts by reorganization.85 Bankruptcy cases are com-
menced when the debtor files a voluntary petition with the bankruptcy
court or when the debtor's creditors file an involuntary petition with
the court.8 6 Once the petition is fied, an estate is created consisting of
the debtor's legal and equitable rights in the property, and a trustee is
commonly appointed to represent the estate. s7 As soon as these pro-
cedural mechanisms are in place, the trustee or debtor-in-possessionss
can proceed to administer the estate.8 9
Bankruptcy adjudications gather together any and all parties claim-
ing a stake in the debtor's assets.' Bankruptcy litigation differs from
ordinary civil adversary proceedings in that it concerns primarily eco-
nomic interests, and is frequently far more complex than even the
most complicated civil proceedings. 91 The lack of a complaint and of
a traditional plaintiff and defendant renders uncertain the issues that
will arise and the nature of the relief that will be sought. 2 There are
thus a large number of potential parties-in-interest in any bankruptcy
case, and often a vast number of litigated matters.93
Generally, claimants must file a proof of claim, which the debtor
can contest by filing an objection.94 Resolution of claims are con-
tested proceedings within the larger bankruptcy case, as opposed to
the primarily one-on-one adversarial proceedings that comprise an or-
dinary civil case.95 There is no right to a jury trial in a claims dis-
pute.96 Courts handle bankruptcy proceedings as expeditiously as
possible, because many economic interests are at stake and the estate
debtor a discharge of all accumulated debt, kmown as a "fresh start." See Gaumer &
Griffith, supra note 82, at 304-05.
85. Reorganization under Chapter 11 allows a corporate or individual debtor to
continue business operations while repaying some debts and receiving a discharge of
other debts. See id. at 306-07 (noting that Chapter 11 relief is complicated and time-
consuming). Under Chapter 13, individual debtors can formulate a plan to make pay-
ments to creditors based on the debtor's future disposable income. See id. at 309.
86. See id. at 301-02.
87. See id. at 302-03.
88. A debtor-in-possession continues to operate the debtor's business in Chapter
11 cases, acting as a fiduciary on behalf of unsecured creditors. See Richard I. Aaron,
Bankruptcy Law Fundamentals § 10.01 (1997).
89. See Gaumer & Griffith, supra note 82, at 310.
90. See Nancy C. Dreher, Stopping the Clock. The Automatic Stay, Litig., Winter
1996, at 16, 17.
91. See Nathalie D. Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the
Outside Looking In, 59 Ohio St. LJ. 429, 446-47 (1998).
92. See i. at 447; see also Larry E. Prince & Robert A. Faucher, Ethical Issues
Facing Idaho Bankruptcy Practitioners, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 309, 311 (1998) (-The system
is not structured like the standard adversarial model, where one party (and its attor-
ney) squares off against the second party (and its attorney)."). Indeed, the bank-
ruptcy attorney not only represents the debtor-client, but to some extent also protects
the interests of the claimants. See Prince & Faucher, supra, at 311-12.
93. See Martin, supra note 91, at 447.
94. See Dreher, supra note 90, at 17.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 18.
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must be administered as swiftly as possible before it dwindles to noth-
ing.97 Despite these efforts, bankruptcy cases often last for years.98
Bankruptcy judges tend to be more intimately involved with the
debtor and the debtor's business,99 and the equitable nature of a
bankruptcy judge's power renders the judge more able to intervene
and to fashion remedies as needed.'
Bankruptcy courts are increasingly becoming the type of court most
often encountered by average citizens.' Individual debtors can liqui-
date their assets under Chapter 7, or they can file for reorganization
and repay their nondisposable income to creditors under Chapter
13.102 Further, corporations and individuals operating a business can
reorganize under Chapter 11.103 Many view the bankruptcy laws as
having a rehabilitative effect for both individuals and corporations. 10
Indeed, the administration of large corporate bankruptcies can reduce
the impact of financial disaster on the commercial sector. 10 5 Bank-
ruptcy litigation is thus of special importance in two respects-as a
means for the average consumer to take remedial action in pursuit of
a "fresh start," and as a process of reducing the financial impact on
the economy of large commercial debt.
C. A Flexible Approach to the Final Judgment Rule
The unusual posture of bankruptcy litigation affects the way courts
formulate the final judgment rule for purposes of an automatic right
to appeal. 10 6 While the rationale behind the finality requirement for
automatic right of appeal focuses on disruptions in the adjudicative
process, 10 7 bankruptcy litigation poses unique concerns that may
97. See id.
98. See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289,299 (D.R.I. 1997),
appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999).
99. See Dreher, supra note 90, at 18.
100. See Greg M. Zipes, Discovery Abuse in the Civil Adversary System: Looking
to Bankruptcy's Regime of Mandatory Disclosure and Third Party Control over the
Discovery Process for Solutions, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 1107, 1151 (1997).
101. See Prince & Faucher, supra note 92, at 310-11.
102. See id. at 317-19 (noting that individual reorganizations take place over a
three-to-five year period).
103. See Gaumer & Griffith, supra note 82, at 306-08. The Supreme Court has held
that individuals not operating businesses are also entitled to file in Chapter 11. See
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991).
104. See Martin, supra note 91, at 436.
105. See id.
106. For a discussion of the final judgment rule, see supra notes 12-19 and accompa-
nying text.
107. See American Freight Sys., Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co. (In re American Freight
Sys., Inc.), 194 B.R. 659, 661 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Interlocutory appeals contravene the
judicial policy opposing piecemeal litigation and the disadvantages of delay and dis-
ruption associated with it."); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Missouri Bank (In re
Kroh Bros. Dev. Co.), 101 B.R. 1000, 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("[B]ecause interlocutory
appeals interfere with the cumulative goal of the bankruptcy system, expeditious reso-
lution of pressing economic difficulties, they are not favored."); Sarah E. Vickers,
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render the finality requirement unfair."' The administration of the
estate can involve numerous preliminary and peripheral issues, fre-
quently involving only some of the parties in any given dispute." As
such, bankruptcy adjudications function as umbrella proceedings that
resolve numerous discrete claims,1'0 and the ability to appeal success-
fully is often lost if the litigants are forced to wait until final resolution
of the case, which may be years later."' Strictly speaking, a final or-
der in a bankruptcy adjudication would be one closing the entire case.
Given this obvious unfairness, courts have tended to treat decisions on
the merits in bankruptcy proceedings as final for purposes of ap-
peal. 1 2 This liberal approach to finality focuses on the resolution of
disputes within the bankruptcy case as a whole, such as an order set-
tling a creditor's claim." 3 In addition to the development of the flexi-
Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in Bankruptcy Cases: The Conflict Between Judicial
Code Sections 158 and 1292, 8 Bankr. Dev. J. 519, 523 (1991) (listing policy reasons
behind the finality requirement for automatic appeal: efficiency of review; negation
of need to appeal if the objecting party wins; rapid progress of litigation; preservation
of respect for a bankruptcy judge's authority; and prevention of harassing delays).
108. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926.2, at 271 (noting that the 1898
Bankruptcy Act took these special needs into account by permitting interlocutory ap-
peals in proceedings in bankruptcy, and that courts and commentators were quick to
develop the flexible finality doctrine after the passage of the 1978 Act and its finality
requirement for appeal as of right).
109. See Kellogg v. United States Dep't of Energy (In re Compton Corp.), 889 F.2d
1104, 1106 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1989); Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc. v. Industrial
Dev. Bd. (In re Martin Bros. Toolmakers, Inc.), 796 F.2d 1435, 1437 (11th Cir. 1986).
110. See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-184 to -185 ("[V]iewed realistically, a
bankruptcy case is simply an aggregation of individual controversies, the resolution of
which must be reached before bankruptcy distribution.").
111. See 9B Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3249, at 741 (1991).
112. See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-184 to -185; see also In re Saco Local Dev.
Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1983) ("Although Congress has defined appellate
bankruptcy jurisdiction in terms... similar to those appearing in other jurisdictional
statutes the history of prior federal bankruptcy law and the 1978 Act convinces us that
Congress did not intend the word 'final' here to have the same meaning ....- (cita-
tion omitted)). But cf. John P. Hennigan, Jr., For Regularizing the Appellate Process, 4
Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 524, 524 (1996) (criticizing the "unpredictable sui generis"
approach to finality in bankruptcy appeals).
113. See In re Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d at 444; see also Knibb, supra note 78,
§ 14.2, at 234-35 ("Various steps in the bankruptcy process are often so distinct and
conclusive either to the rights of the parties or the ultimate outcome of the proceed-
ing that final decisions as to them are appealable as of right."); 16 Wright & Miller,
supra note 48, § 3926.2, at 284 (noting that other specific reasons necessitate a flexible
rule of finality in bankruptcy, such as the fact that the value of the bankrupt estate can
be enhanced by permitting immediate appeal from an order approving a sale).
Wright and Miller comment, for example, that the finality analysis used by the Third
Circuit "could lead almost anywhere," id. at 287, and describe that analysis as invok-
ing the following factors: "the impact upon the assets of the bankrupt estate, the
necessity for further fact-finding on remand, the preclusive effect of our decision on
the merits on further litigation, and whether the interest of judicial economy would be
furthered." Id. (quoting In re Meyertech Corp., 831 F.2d 410, 413-14 (3d Cir. 1987)).
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ble finality doctrine, the collateral order and the Forgay-Conrad
doctrines" 4 have been imported into the bankruptcy context.1 5
D. Bankruptcy Appellate Structure
Prior to enactment of the 1978 Act, bankruptcy appeals were distin-
guished between those arising in "plenary" proceedings"16 and those
arising in "summary" 1 7 proceedings*118 The two types of appeals
were governed by different appeals provisions-the former by the
general appeals statutes of title 28, the latter by § 24(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 119 Under § 24(a), interlocutory appeals were available as
of right from orders entered in "proceedings" in bankruptcy, but not
in "controversies" in bankruptcy. 20  Essentially, matters relating to
the administration of the estate constituted "proceedings," and claims
by or against outside parties represented "controversies. "121 Despite
the literal language of § 24(a), courts tended to narrowly interpret liti-
gants' ability to appeal interlocutory rulings in bankruptcy proceed-
114. See supra notes 26-30, 35-36 and accompanying text.
115. See Trustee of Jartran, Inc. v. Winston & Strawn, 208 B.R. 898, 901-02 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (noting that the collateral order exception is appropriate only for a "small
class of prejudgment orders that finally determine claims of right"); Collier, supra
note 7, § 3.03, at 3-187 to -188. Indeed, the flexible finality doctrine is modeled on the
collateral order doctrine, which affords immediate review to matters tangential to the
main cause of action. See Knibb, supra note 78, § 14.4, at 241.
116. A plenary matter referred to an ordinary civil matter, regarding which the
trustee or receiver could bring suit only in a state or federal court that had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the matter in question. See Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Re-
leases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisiting Jurisdictional Precepts and the
Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 Am. Bankr. L.J. 1, 24 (1998).
117. Summary proceedings were those relating to the assets of the debtor's estate.
See Susan Block-Lieb, Permissive Bankruptcy Abstention, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 781, 797
n.91 (1998).
118. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926, at 228 (asserting that the dis-
tinctions between "summary" and "plenary" proceedings were vague).
119. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 24(a), 30 Stat. 544, 553 (repealed 1978);
16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926, at 228.
120. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926 at 229. Wright and Miller de-
scribe a functional approach to the conundrum of what should qualify as a proceeding
in bankruptcy under the old act developed by Judge Hufstedler: "Appealability thus
turns on a sensitive examination of the legal issues involved, the impact of the deci-
sion on future bankruptcy administration, the need for interlocutory review and its
practical utility." Id. at 233-34 (quoting In re*Brissette, 561 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.
1977)). For a contemporary case interpreting the former statute relating to interlocu-
tory appeals, see Hoehn v. McIntosh, 110 F.2d 199, 201 (6th Cir. 1940).
121. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926, at 230-31.
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ings.' 22  As to "controversies," 28 U.S.C. § 1292 governed
interlocutory appeals. 123
Under the 1978 Act, Congress repealed section 24(a) and replaced
it with a system that allowed each circuit to choose from two possible
routes of appeal. 24 If the circuit chose to establish a Bankruptcy Ap-
pellate Panel ("BAP"), that panel would have jurisdiction over all fi-
nal orders of the bankruptcy courts; interlocutory appeals were
available with leave of the panel."2 If the circuit chose not to estab-
lish a BAP, district courts had jurisdiction to hear appeals from final
orders, and interlocutory appeals could be taken to the district court
with leave of that court. 2 6 Furthermore, the parties could agree to
bypass the district court or BAP and appeal directly to the court of
appeals from final orders of bankruptcy judges. 27
Under the 1984 Amendments, 28 U.S.C. § 158 governs appeals
from bankruptcy court rulings., 8 Section 158(a) confers jurisdiction
on the district courts to hear appeals from "final judgments, orders
and decrees" 29 of the bankruptcy courts,'13 as does § 1291's provision
for appeals from district courts to courts of appeals.' 3 ' District courts
have jurisdiction under § 158(a)(3) over interlocutory appeals 132 in
cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy court "with leave of
122. See id at 229, 236 (noting that despite the language of the rule, courts refused
to grant leave to appeal orders having little effect on the litigation under the "trivial
order" doctrine, and sometimes required something very near to finality before leave
would be granted); see also Triangle Elec. Co. v. Foutch, 40 FI2d 353, 355 (8th Cir.
1930) ("The consensus of opinion [as to the application of § 24(a)] is that appeals
from purely intermediate and preliminary orders should be allowed, if at all, only in
very exceptional cases."); Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-197 (asserting that, under
the 1898 Act, an interlocutory order must have "substantially determined some issue
or decided some step in the course of the proceeding").
123. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926 at 234-35.
124. See id at 242; see also id. at 244 (stating that the 1978 statute was a "drafting
disaster," and that the new appellate provisions were internally confusing).
125. See id at 242.
126. See id. at 243.
127. See i. One treatise notes that the standard for appeal under the 1978 Act was
"undoubtedly somewhat more rigorous" than under § 24(a). Collier, supra note 7,
§ 3.03, at 3-197.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (amended 1994).
129. Id- § 158(a)(1).
130. Final orders in the bankruptcy context include those arising from core pro-
ceedings, noncore proceedings which the parties have agreed that the bankruptcy
judge may hear, and noncore proceedings in which the defendant has failed to prop-
erly object to the procedures used by the bankruptcy judge. See Collier, supra note 7,
§ 3.03, at 3-167.
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
132. Such interlocutory rulings can arise in all civil proceedings in which the bank-
ruptcy judge will render a final order, and in which the judge makes recommendations
to the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03,
at 3-167.
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the court. ' 133 The statute, however, contains no other criteria or gui-
dance to aid district courts that are considering whether or not to hear
an interim appeal.' Alternatively, interlocutory appeals can be
taken to a BAP, if the circuit had established one.'35 In order to ap-
peal to a BAP, the district court must have authorized the referral,
and all parties must consent. 136
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over all final judgments, or-
ders, and decrees entered by district judges under sections (a) and (b)
of § 158. 13 However, § 158 lacks a provision for appeal to the courts
of appeals from interlocutory orders of district courts ruling on bank-
ruptcy appeals; as might be expected, this initially led to much confu-
sion. In Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,131 the Supreme Court
addressed this problem and held that pursuant to § 1292(b), courts of
appeals had jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals from rulings of
district courts on interlocutory orders of bankruptcy courts. 139 Thus, a
133. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). "[W]ith leave of the court" has been construed to refer
to the district court, not the bankruptcy court judge. As such, it is not necessary that
bankruptcy judges certify the appeal, as is required of district judges when parties
wish to appeal an interlocutory order to the court of appeals. See Carlos J. Cuevas,
Judicial Code Section 158: The Final Order Doctrine, 18 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1, 18-20
(1988) (arguing that the better interpretation in light of the authority of district courts
over bankruptcy courts, and in view of the plain meaning of the statute, is that certifi-
cation is not required); Knibb, supra note 78, § 14.4, at 240.
134. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 42 B.R. 651, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The stat-
utes and rules do not provide a standard for evaluating the merits of motions for leave
to appeal interlocutory bankruptcy court orders."); Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-
196. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) reads in full as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear
appeals
(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees;
(2) from interlocutory orders and decrees issued under section 1121(d) of
title 11 increasing or reducing the time periods referred to in section 1121 of
such title; and
(3) with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees;
and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory appeals and decrees, of
bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bank-
ruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this subsection
shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which the
bankruptcy judge is serving.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1); Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-165 to -167.
136. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1), (4), (6). The necessity that all parties consent was
inserted as a result of the Marathon decision, due to congressional concern that an
Article III judge be available should the parties wish. See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03,
at 3-170.
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
138. 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
139. See id. at 254 ("So long as a party to a proceeding or case in bankruptcy meets
the conditions imposed by § 1292, a court of appeals may rely on that statute as a
basis for jurisdiction."); see also Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03 at 3-199 (summarizing the
Germain decision); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens:
A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 38-42 (1996)
(criticizing the overly simplistic textual analysis in the Germain decision). In both
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district court's interlocutory appellate ruling on an interlocutory ap-
peal from a bankruptcy judge's order is not automatically appealable
to the court of appeals under § 158(d). 40
The 1994 amendment to § 158(b) requires that each circuit establish
a BAP.141 These panels consist of three bankruptcy judges,'142 and
serve as alternative routes of appeal for bankruptcy litigants.143 The
constitutionality of appeal to a non-Article III judicial panel has been
questioned in the wake of the Marathon decision.'" The Ninth Cir-
cuit has held that because appeal from a BAP decision to the court of
appeals is available, BAPs function as adjuncts to the courts of ap-
peals.145 The Ninth Circuit has also held that district courts are not
core and noncore proceedings, district courts can certify appeal pursuant to § 1292(b)
as in any other matter. See Knibb, supra note 78, § 14A, at 240-41. It has been noted
that the statute is also silent on the question of the ability to appeal an interlocutory
order of a BAP to a court of appeals, see id. § 14.1, at 234, and that § 1292(b) cannot
form a basis for such an appeal because it applies exclusively to district courts. See 16
Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926.1, at 257 (citing Vylene Enters. v. Naugles, Inc.
(In re Vylene Enters.), 968 F.2d 887, 890 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992)). This renders uncertain
the ability to appeal an interlocutory ruling of a BAP based on an interim order of a
bankruptcy court.
140. See 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926.2, at 279-80 (rejecting the theory
that a district court ruling on an interlocutory appeal is in a sense a "final" ruling).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). The previous version of the statute rendered the deci-
sion whether or not to establish such panels optional. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1988)
(amended 1994). Under the current version, the judicial council of each circuit may
decline to establish a BAP only if it finds that there are insufficient judicial resources
available in the circuit to establish the panel, or if such establishment would result in
undue delay or increased cost to the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
The statute also outlines criteria for reconsideration of the council's conclusions. See
id. § 158(b)(2)(A)-(D). Prior to the 1994 amendment, only the Ninth Circuit had
established and retained a BAP. See Knibb, supra note 78, § 14.1, at 232 n.11. Advo-
cates of BAPs claim that among their merits are "that decisions are rendered by
judges with expertise in bankruptcy matters, that appellate decisions will be more
coherent and consistent because of the greater quantity of bankruptcy appeals de-
cided, and that there will be fewer appeals to the circuit court from BAP decisions
than from district court decisions." Broome, supra note 3, at 545.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5).
143. Under § 158(c)(1), appeals are routed automatically to the BAP, unless at the
time of filing, the appellant elects to have the district court hear the appeal, or within
thirty days following service of notice of the appeal another party objects to the BAP
forum. See id. § 158(c)(1).
144. See 9B Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3272, at 773 (1991) (noting that the court of
appeals reviews legal findings of BAPs de novo and findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard). For a general discussion of the constitutionality of BAPs, see
Donald A. Brittenham, Jr., Note, The Pros and Cons Behind the First Circuit's Deci-
sion to Establish Bankruptcy Appellate Panels and the Growing Question of Whether
the Panels Will Last, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 215, 238-43 (1997).
145. See Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614,620
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993) (citing with approval In re Burley). But see 6 Norton Bankr.
L. & Prac. 2d § 148:17, at 148-67 n.57 (1997) (noting that In re Burley was decided
before the 1994 Amendments, which grant BAPs jurisdiction to hear appeals only if
the district court has so certified, and asserting that this requirement undermines the
notion that BAPs are adjuncts of the circuit courts).
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bound by BAP precedent in their circuit, because Article III judges
cannot be made to defer to non-Article III judges. 4 6 Similarly, BAPs
are not technically bound by district court decisions, though they
should in general afford deference to those decisions.147 Questions
surrounding the precedential value of BAP decisions are of increasing
concern as more and more circuits establish the panels in response to
the 1994 amendment to § 158(b). 4 8
146. See Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990).
Bankruptcy courts, however, should be bound by BAP precedent in their circuit in
order to further judicial coherence and to fulfill the role of BAPs. See In re Windmill
Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 841 F.2d
1467 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Far W. Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59,
62 (D. Or. 1987) (analogizing BAPs' precedential role to those of district courts within
a circuit, and finding that BAP decisions should be binding only on bankruptcy courts
within the district from which an appeal arose). See generally Baisier & Epstein, supra
note 1, at 531 (discussing the precedential value, or lack thereof, of BAP decisions);
Brittenham, supra note 144, at 248-51 (asserting that BAP decisions should be af-
forded precedential value); Broome, supra note 3, at 541-43 (detailing the problems
arising from uncertainty over the state of the law both for litigants and for parties
structuring commercial transactions); Bussel, supra note 81, at 1071-99 (arguing that
both district court and BAP decisions should bind bankruptcy courts).
147. See 9B Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3276, at 776.
148. See Henry J. Boroff, The Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
Decisions, Com. L.J., Summer 1998, at 212. Since the 1994 amendment, the First,
Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have elected to establish BAPs. See id. at
214.
In critiquing the current state of the bankruptcy appellate structure, some commen-
tators have called for a three-judge panel of an Article III appellate court to hear all
bankruptcy appeals. See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 1, at 537 (endorsing the ap-
proach developed by Professor Daniel J. Bussel, Nathan B. Feinstein, and the Honor-
able Steven W. Rhodes). Suggested avenues for direct appeals include a newly
created United States Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy, or the currently existing
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See id. at 538-39 (noting the danger of ap-
pellate specialization and resultant debtor favoritism inherent in an exclusive appel-
late court for bankruptcy). This proposal is founded in concern over the lack of
precedential value of bankruptcy appellate decisions. See id. at 537-38. By instilling in
such appellate panels the power to bind all courts, these commentators argue, uni-
formity in the laws governing commercial transactions can be achieved. See id. (noting
that bankruptcy courts are the nation's "most significant commercial courts," and that
bankruptcy decisions are the "principal source of case law regarding commercial
credit transactions"). Others urge the availability of direct appeal to the courts of
appeals, an approach which has been adopted by the Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion. See 1 National Bankr. Review Comm'n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years T
3.1.4, at 35 (1997); Broome, supra note 3, at 546-49 (proposing the availability of this
option upon the parties' consent); Crabb, supra note 1, at 141-47 ("The issues raised
in bankruptcy appeals are as worthy of consideration by an appellate body as those
raised in appeals from district court decisions. Having to undergo a preliminary re-
view simply adds to the costs of appeal and extends the period of uncertainty for the
parties . . , ."). These authorities propose that access to the courts of appeals be
available as either a sole means of appeal, or as an option in cases in which a prece-
dential ruling would be beneficial or when large amounts of money are involved. See
Broome, supra note 3, at 548. Elimination of a second layer of appeal would reduce
the costs both to litigants and to the system, as it would negate the need to establish
BAPs. See Crabb, supra note 1, at 147.
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The foregoing discussion illustrates the uncertainty that pervades
much of the jurisdictional and appellate structure of the bankruptcy
system. Questions of the scope of the flexible finality doctrine, liti-
gants' rights in the appellate context, and the precedential value of
BAP opinions are recurrent themes in this developing body of law. In
the face of this legal morass, courts and commentators have attempted
to hammer out interpretations of particularly vague and unhelpful
statutes, and nowhere is this piecemeal approach more evident than in
the standards that district courts have chosen to apply in determining
whether to hear interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy court
rulings.149
III. BANKRUPTCY INTERLOCUTORY Appeals
This part examines the decisions of most district courts and BAPs to
import the strict criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) into the bankruptcy
context, requiring that litigants meet its three-pronged test to warrant
interim appeal. This part also examines the decisions of several courts
that have chosen to adopt a more flexible application of § 1292(b) in
bankruptcy by focusing on the unique posture of bankruptcy proceed-
ings and the potential harm to litigants from denial of an immediate
right to appeal.
A. Widespread Adoption of the § 1292(b) Standard
In the absence of a statutory standard in 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) de-
lineating the criteria that district courts and BAPs should apply in de-
termining whether or not to hear interlocutory appeals from
bankruptcy court rulings, the majority of courts have turned to the
criteria laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).15 0 Courts often add an addi-
149. See Knibb, supra note 78, § 14.4, at 239 (noting that the law on interlocutory
appeals is "not fully developed.... [And] [t]he bankruptcy statute is poorly drafted").
150. See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03 at 3-196 (noting that § 1292(b) provides the
closest analogue in the absence of a statutory standard); 9B Am. Jur. 2d Bankrnptcy
§ 3254, at 749 (stating that the criteria for hearing an interlocutory appeal under
§ 158(a) are similar to those provided in § 1292(b)). Courts have applied § 1292(b) in
a variety of factual contexts. See, e.g., Merchants Bank v. Vescio, 205 B.R. 37, 40 (D.
Vt. 1997) (granting leave to appeal a bankruptcy court's order requiring a bank to
produce documents claimed to be protected by a bank-examination privilege); North-
east Say., F.A. v. Geremia (In re Kalian), 191 B.R. 275,278-79 (D.R.I. 1996) (denying
leave to appeal a bankruptcy court's determination that a mortgagee was not entitled
to mortgage payments as adequate protection-it was settled law that absent a show-
ing of depreciating collateral, no such protection is warranted); Fischer v. 47th St.
Photo, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6529, 1993 WL 126525, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1993) (deny-
ing leave to appeal an order granting partial summary judgment on several, but not
all, causes of action); In re MCorp Financial, Inc., 139 B.R. 820, 821, 823 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (denying leave to appeal a bankruptcy court's denial of the debtors' chapter 11
reorganization plan); Kroh Bros. Dev. Co. v. United Missouri Bank (In re Kroh Bros.
Dev. Co.), 101 B.R. 1000, 1004-07 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (denying leave to appeal an order
allowing a specially appointed representative to bring an action against the debtor for
fraudulent transfer); United States Trustee v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit
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tional requirement to those of § 1292(b), stating that a bankruptcy in-
terim appeal will be heard only after a showing of "exceptional
circumstances.' 151  Indeed, the pervasive practice of substituting
§ 1292(b) for the permissive language of § 158(a)(3) has developed
the force of a legal rule.' 52 This hostility toward hearing interlocutory
Corp.), 99 B.R. 762, 767-68 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the denial of an attorney
disqualification motion does not qualify as a controlling question of law, and hearing
such an appeal does not materially advance the litigation); Harlem-Irving Realty, Inc.
v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc. (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 68 B.R. 578, 580 (N.D. Il. 1986)
(denying an appeal challenging a bankruptcy court's decision to hold a hearing on the
appellant's request for relief from an automatic stay; the determination of whether a
lease had been terminated before the debtor filed for bankruptcy is a core proceeding
and the appellant will not be disadvantaged by the denial of leave to appeal); Bertoli
v. D'Avella (In re Bertoli), 58 B.R. 992, 995-96 (D.N.J. 1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d 136 (3d
Cir. 1987) (granting leave to appeal a res judicata claim where its resolution in a
trustee's favor could lead to the dismissal of the entire action); Robinson v. Silverman
(In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 47 B.R. 957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying leave to
appeal a bankruptcy judge's refusal to disqualify counsel for an alleged conflict of
interest). Other examples of interlocutory appeals that have been granted under the
criteria of § 1292(b) include orders determining whether a proceeding is core or
noncore, granting a motion to strike a demand for a jury trial made in the context of a
core proceeding, appointing a legal representative on behalf of potential future claim-
ants against a debtor, staying the United States Government from prosecuting the
debtor for antitrust violations, and awarding attorneys' fees as a sanction. See 6 Nor-
ton Bankr. L. & Prac. 2d, supra note 145, § 148:15, at 148-53 to -54. Examples of
appeals that have been denied include orders that denied a motion to dismiss a Chap-
ter 11 case and granted a motion to convert a Chapter 11 reorganization case to a
Chapter 7 liquidation, denied motions to abstain from or dismiss an adversary pro-
ceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determined a debtor's net worth for
purposes of calculating its liability under ERISA for the termination of a pension
plan, denied the motion of a potential future claimant of the debtor for transfer of
venue, and denied the motion of a future claimant against a debtor to disqualify coun-
sel for the legal representative of future claimants. See id. at 148-54.
151. 9B Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3254, at 750. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. National
Shoes, Inc. (In re National Shoes, Inc.), 20 B.R. 672, 673-74 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982)
(denying a motion to appeal an order transferring the appellant's complaint against
the debtor to another venue, on the ground that the appellant's motion failed to in-
voke exceptional circumstances as the proceeding was in its early stages and transfer
to the debtor's home court is proper); Victor v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. (In re Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc.), No. CIV.A. 96-177-SLR, 1996 WL 363806, at *3 (D. Del. June 27,
1996) (noting that exceptional circumstances must warrant departure from the gen-
eral policy against interlocutory review); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 47 B.R. at 961
(holding that the appellant had neither passed the § 1292(b) test nor shown excep-
tional circumstances justifying immediate appeal). The exceptional circumstances re-
quirement is derived from the Supreme Court's statement in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay to the effect that appellants from district courts to courts of appeals must
demonstrate exceptional circumstances to warrant interim review. See Americare
Health Group, Inc. v. Melillo, 223 B.R. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978)).
152. See, e.g., 6 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 2d, supra note 145, § 148:15 ("District
courts have not permitted appeals from all nonfinal orders and decrees entered by
bankruptcy judges. Instead, they have uniformly limited their appellate jurisdiction
over such orders to the circumstances provided for in an analogous statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292."); Henry Gabriel & Scott Beal, Fifth Circuit Appeals from Bankruptcy Deci-
sions, 15 Miss. C. L. Rev. 309, 312 (1995) ("Although § 158(a) does not define the
parameters of this discretion [to hear interlocutory appeals], the district courts have
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appeals contrasts with the general policy in favor of bankruptcy ap-
peals reflected in the flexible finality doctrine.1 53
The rationale behind the widespread adoption of § 1292(b) in the
bankruptcy context rests on several grounds. Because § 1292(b) is the
sole statute available evidencing congressional intent as to appropri-
ateness of interlocutory review, it is in many ways only natural that
district courts should turn to it for guidance in the absence of a similar
statute in the bankruptcy context. 154 Congress enacted § 1292(b) as a
standard relating to the propriety of hearing interlocutory appeals be-
tween district courts and courts of appeals. 155 Section 1292(b) reflects
the legislative judgment disfavoring interim appeals except under spe-
cific, particularized circumstances.5 6 The stringent requirements con-
tained in the statute reflect a bias against piecemeal appeals that can
disrupt the litigation process. 57 District courts applying § 1292(b) to
bankruptcy appeals have noted with approval the policy behind the
statute, and have extended its rationale to their application of
§ 158(a)(3).Y In addition, § 1292(b) gives structure to a district
court's deliberations, 5 9 offering peace of mind and ease of use. t6°
uniformly limited their review to those circumstances in which an appeal may be
taken from the district court to the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).").
153. See In re Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 1996 WL 363806, at *3 ("Although the
concept of finality is accorded some measure of flexibility in the context of § 158(a)(1)
appeals, apparently the same standard does not apply in the context of § 158(a)(3)
interlocutory appeals."); Shalom L. Kohn, Secured Creditors' Rights and Alternatives
After Timbers, in ALI-ABA Course of Study: Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations
575 (1989) (unpublished course outline, on file with the Fordhan Last, Review); supra
notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., Trustee of Jartran, Inc. v. Winston & Strawn, 208 B.R. 898, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (stating that § 1292(b) is "instructive" on the question of the standard to be
applied to bankruptcy interlocutory appeals).
155. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 469, 473 (D. Del. 1989)
(holding that an appellant must establish "exceptional circumstances [that] justify a
departure from the basic policy of postponing review until after the entry of final
judgment"), aftd, 884 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1989); Harlem-Irving Realty, Inc. v. Wie-
boldt Stores, Inc. (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 68 B.R. 578, 580 (N.D. I11. 1986)
("[I]nterlocutory bankruptcy appeals should be the exception rather than the rule; we
do not want to encourage piecemeal appeals."); In re Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 57
B.R. 371, 372 (N.D. Tex. 1985) ("Because interlocutory appeals interfere with the
overriding goal of the bankruptcy system, expeditious resolution of pressing economic
difficulties,... they are not favored." (citations omitted)).
159. See Maquoketa State Bank v. Hayes (In re Hayes Bankruptcy), 220 B.R. 57, 62
(N.D. Iowa 1998) (positing that courts have adopted § 1292(b) due to a felt necessity
to "impose a[n analytical] structure" on § 158(a)(3) appeals).
160. See eg., Pileckas v. Marcucio, 156 B.R. 721,724 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that
while leave to appeal is within the "sound discretion" of the district court, it may use
§ 1292(b) by analogy). Perhaps as a reflection of the inherent convenience of using
§ 1292(b), many courts fail to articulate a basis for the analogy, and simply apply its
criteria with little reflection. See, e.g., Bertain v. Mitchell (In re Bertain), 215 B.R. 438,
441 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997) (noting without analysis the appropriateness of the adop-
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In substituting the criteria in § 1292(b) for the statutory language
"with leave of the court" in § 158(a)(3), courts require that (1) the
order sought to be reviewed involve a controlling question of law, (2)
as to which a substantial ground for difference of opinion exists, and
(3) that immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termi-
nation of the litigation. 6' Courts have defined a controlling question
of law as one that will materially affect the outcome of the litigation,
whose "incorrect disposition amounts to reversible error on appeal,"
or more liberally as one in which interlocutory reversal will save the
litigants time and expense." The third requirement, that hearing the
appeal materially advance the litigation, involves an analysis similar to
that under the "controlling question of law" criterion. 163 One court
has noted that this element requires either that the appeal save parties
significant time and expense or that it prevent irreparable harm."6
Courts have interpreted the second element, a "substantial ground for
difference of opinion," as involving an issue of heightened complexity
and first impression. 165 Together, these criteria require a would-be
tion of § 1292(b)); In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 139 B.R. 820, 823 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating
simply that the standards for granting interlocutory appeal from a bankruptcy court
are guided by § 1292(b)); United States Trustee v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM
Credit Corp.), 99 B.R. 762, 767 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (noting that in the absence of a
statutory standard, "courts have looked to circuit court standards").
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994). The movant bears the burden of meeting
these criteria, and this burden has been termed a "heavy one." Northeast Say., F.A. v.
Geremia (In re Kalian), 191 B.R. 275, 278 (D.R.I. 1996) (citation omitted).
162. In re PHM Credit Corp., 99 B.R. at 768; see also McGillicuddy v. Clements,
746 F.2d 76, 76 n.1 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[Ijnterlocutory certification under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) [in the court of appeals context] should be used sparingly and only in excep-
tional circumstances, and where the proposed intermediate appeal presents one or
more difficult and pivotal questions of law not settled by controlling authority.").
163. See Fleet Data Processing Corp. v. Branch (In re Bank of New England
Corp.), 218 B.R. 643, 654 n.21 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) (stating that "both are directed
toward assuring that the interlocutory review will advance the resolution of the un-
derlying action").
164. See Victor v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. (In re Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.), No.
CIV.A. 96-177-SLR, 1996 WL 363806, at *3 (D. Del. June 27, 1996) (denying leave to
appeal order rejecting appellants' request to establish an official equity committee to
protect appellant public shareholders' rights in the bankruptcy, and noting that even if
appellants' rights were "materially advanc[ed]," this did not equate to materially ad-
vancing the litigation); American Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 61 B.R. 678, 683
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that an issue that is the "focal point" of the proceeding is not
enough).
165. See In re Bank of New England, 218 B.R. at 653 (finding that the contract
interpretation issue before it did not rise to the "level of difficulty and significance
required under § 1292(b)"); American Freight Sys., Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co. (In re
American Freight Sys., Inc.), 194 B.R. 659, 662 (D. Kan. 1996) ("The court will not
resort to speculating that a substantial basis exists simply because the applicants have
not demonstrated one."). At least one court has rejected this criterion in the context
of bankruptcy appeals:
To conclude that a district court may grant leave to appeal where a substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion exists but not where the court believes
that the bankruptcy court's decision is contrary to well-established law
would create the absurd result that interlocutory bankruptcy decisions in-
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appellant to meet a high threshold in order to obtain a discretionary
interim appeal.166
B. Departure from a Strict § 1292(b) Analysis
Although the vast majority of courts have elected to utilize
§ 1292(b) as a substitute standard when confronting bankruptcy inter-
locutory appeals, a small number of courts have taken a more contem-
plative approach to its use. 67 The First Circuit has recently produced
volving close questions of law may be appealable but those that are clearly
reversible may not.
Official Bondholders Comm. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (In re Marvel Entertainment
Group, Inc.), 209 B.R. 832, 837-38 (D. Del. 1997).
166. An illustrative example of a court that applied § 1292(b) when a more flexible
standard had been advocated by other authorities occurred in the context of venue
orders. In United States Trustee v. Sorrells (In re Sorrells), 218 B.R. 580 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 1998), a Tenth Circuit BAP granted leave to appeal a bankruptcy court's denial of
the Trustee's motion either to dismiss for improper venue, or to transfer to another
venue. See id. at 581. Because venue orders are ordinarily treated as nonfinal, the
BAP considered its jurisdiction to hear the appeal under § 158(a)(3). See id. at 582.
The court termed the § 1292(b) surrogate standard the "Traditional Strict Test for
Interlocutory Review," noting that some courts have argued for a lesser standard for
appeals of interlocutory venue orders. Id. at 582-83. The court rejected this more
flexible approach, drawing in part on § 158(c)(2), which states that appeals from
bankruptcy court orders "shall be taken in the same manner as appeals in civil pro-
ceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts." Id. at
584 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2)); see also Whaley v. United States, 76 B.R. 95, 96
(N.D. Miss. 1987) (citing § 158(c) as a basis for a § 1292(b) analogy)). But cf Bertoli
v. D'Avella (In re Bertoli), 812 F.2d 136, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting debtor's
argument that § 158(c) should be read to import the requirement, contained in
§ 1292(b), that the lower court must certify the appeal, and noting the plenary author-
ity that district courts exercise over bankruptcy judges). The Tenth Circuit also ex-
pressed a desire to afford consistency in the standard for granting appeals of venue
orders in bankruptcy cases. See In re Sorrells, 218 B.R. at 584. By contrast, the court
in ICMR, Inc v. Tri-City Foods, Inc., 100 B.R. 51 (D. Kan. 1989), held that appeals
relating to venue orders should be more readily granted in bankruptcy due to the
potentially lengthy nature of the proceedings, and rejected application of § 1292(b) in
this context. See id. at 53-54 (implying that because bankruptcy cases can last for
years, an appeal of a venue order after final judgment is entered is highly unlikely to
succeed) (citing I Collier on Bankruptcy § 3.02[4][fl (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1988)).
167. Some of these courts have applied alternative standards under § 158(a)(3),
without invoking § 1292(b) at all. One such approach to hearing interlocutory ap-
peals seeks to distinguish run-of-the-mill interim appeals from those that will advance
the case or proceeding. See Edith H. Jones, Bankruptcy Appeals, 16 T. Marshall L
Rev. 245, 251 (1991). Another approach has imported the criteria from the collateral
order doctrine, seeking basically to convert the interlocutory order into a "final" or-
der. See Collier, supra note 7, § 3.03, at 3-198 (citing Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. White
Motor Corp. (In re White Motor Corp.), 25 B.R 293,294-96 (N.D. Ohio 1982)), and
Collateral Control Corp. v. Deal (In re Covington Grain Co.), 638 F.2d 1357, 1360
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981)); Midland Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sellers, 101 B.R. 921, 928 (S.D.
Ohio 1989) (noting that a "useful standard for the determination of whether a district
court ought to exercise its discretion to entertain an interlocutory appeal is the collat-
eral order doctrine" (footnotes omitted)). For a definition of the collateral order doc-
trine, see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. Yet another court has stated that
unless the appellant can show that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion or acted
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a line of cases stemming from a district court's opinion in Williams v.
United States (In re Williams) 168 that illustrates the appropriateness of
a more flexible use of § 1292(b) in bankruptcy. Williams concerned
monetary and alleged verbal sanctions imposed on two government
lawyers by the bankruptcy court for discovery violations.1 69 On ap-
peal, the attorneys claimed that the bankruptcy court exceeded its au-
thority by imposing a criminal fine, and that the attorneys' due
process rights were violated. 7 ° The government joined the appeal,
arguing that the bankruptcy court's ruling that the attorneys could not
seek reimbursement from their employer violated the separation of
powers doctrine.' 7 ' The First Circuit considers monetary discovery
sanctions imposed on attorneys to be nonfinal orders, which are ordi-
narily unappealable. 172 Because the bankruptcy judge had also issued
two opinions vehemently criticizing the attorneys, 7 3 however, the dis-
trict court found that the danger of injury to reputation counseled in
favor of allowing interlocutory appeal. 74
In reaching this conclusion, the Williams court noted the imperfec-
tion of the analogy of using § 1292(b) as a surrogate standard in bank-
ruptcy, and stated that the decision to do so is "jurisprudential and not
jurisdictional."' 75 The court found that because district courts exer-
cise plenary authority over bankruptcy cases, retaining the power to
refer cases to, and to withdraw them from, the bankruptcy courts, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to limit district courts' power to hear
capriciously in its ruling, the appeal will not lie. See In re Executive Office Ctrs., Inc.,
75 B.R. 60, 61 (E.D. La. 1987) ("[D]istrict courts are ... to determine whether the
bankruptcy court has stated some rational or reasonable basis for its decision or
whether the applicant has known [sic] that the bankruptcy court acted arbitrarily or
capriciously or abused its discretion.").
168. 215 B.R. 289 (D.R.I. 1997), appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 905 (1999).
169. See id. at 296.
170. See id. at 297.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 298.
173. See id. at 296-97. The bankruptcy court had referred to the attorneys' conduct
as "'egregious'. . . 'autocratic'. .. 'intentional, unprofessional and unjustified."' Id. at
296 (quoting Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 181 B.R. 1, 2-5 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1995)).
174. See id. at 297-98 ("Although there is no constitutionally protected interest in
one's reputation ... some courts have found that a published reprimand of an attor-
ney confers standing in that attorney to appeal injurious findings of fact." (citations
omitted)). The district court ultimately dismissed the monetary sanctions. See id. at
303. The attorneys then appealed that decision, seeking solely to vacate the bank-
ruptcy court's findings of misconduct. See Williams v. United States (In re Williams),
156 F.3d 86, 89 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999). On appeal, the First
Circuit faced the question of whether the bankruptcy court's published findings of
attorney misconduct supported appeal absent monetary sanctions. See id. at 87. The
court answered this question in the negative and dismissed the appeal, holding that
the bankruptcy court's opinion constituted findings of fact, and did not operate as a
sanction. See id. at 89-93.
175. In re Williams. 215 B.R. at 298 n.6.
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interlocutory appeals. 76 The court acknowledged the strong policy
against piecemeal review, and the usefulness of § 1292(b) in many cir-
cumstances, but found that it was not jurisdictionally bound to apply
that standard. 77 It observed that bankruptcy proceedings often ex-
tend for a number of years, and that the threat of continuing injury
during this time may warrant immediate appeal. s1 7  The court con-
cluded that in a situation such as this, where "'serious, perhaps irrepa-
rable consequence[s]' are threatened which can be 'effectually
challenged only by immediate appeal,"' granting leave to appeal is
appropriate.1
79
Although one court has criticized Williams,"m others have noted its
approach with approval. For example, in Foreign Car Center, Inc. v.
Salem Suede, Inc. (In re Salem Suede, Inc.),' the district court
granted leave to one of several appellants to appeal from an order
denying summary judgment." 2 Although such orders are usually con-
sidered nonfinal, the court utilized a flexible finality and "exceptional
conditions" analysis to further "the articulated goals of discretionary
appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals" in the bankruptcy
context. 8 3 The court stated that discretion under § 158 is greater than
that under § 1292(b), 1' and noted that the bankruptcy court's order
finding an insurance contract provision ambiguous was unclear.ns5
According to the court, leaving a murky record would impair the trial
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id at 299 (finding that hearing the appeal would not delay advancement of
the proceedings below); cf Northeast Say., F.A. v. Geremia (In re Kalian), 191 B.R.
275, 278 (D.R.I. 1996) (noting that § 1292(b) as applied by courts of appeals is "usu-
ally reserved for complex and prolonged litigation such as an antitrust or a conspiracy
matter").
179. In re Williams, 215 B.R. at 298 n.6 (quoting Carson v. American Brands, Inc.,
450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)).
180. A First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel rejected the Williams approach in
Fleet Data Processing Corp. v. Brand (In re Bank of New England Corp.). 218 B.R.
643, 652 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998). In denying appellant leave to appeal from an order
granting summary judgment against it and requiring that it indemnify the debtor for
liability toward a third party, see hiL at 645, the BAP reasoned that the order was not
final because it involved only a single count in an ongoing six-count adversary pro-
ceeding. See id. at 647-48. After finding that the order also did not fall within the
collateral order doctrine for appeals of nonfinal orders, see id. at 649-51, the court
denied leave to appeal under § 158(a)(3). See id. at 654. While the court acknowl-
edged Williams, it held that § 1292(b) provided "appropriate guidance for (and limita-
tion of) our exercises of discretionary jurisdiction under § 158(a)(3)." Id. at 652. The
court stated as an aside that even were it to apply an alternative "responsible ap-
proach," the appeal simply did not merit interlocutory review as it did not dispose of
the remaining counts in the proceeding and involved a mundane matter of contract
interpretation. Id. at 653-54 & n.22.
181. 221 B.R. 586 (D. Mass. 1998).
182. See id. at 594.
183. Id. at 599.
184. See id. at 596.
185. See id. at 601.
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judge, to whom the case would be transferred, from properly identify-
ing triable issues of fact-"a consideration that is unique to a bank-
ruptcy context.' '1 86
In BancBoston Real Estate Capital Corp. v. JBI Associates Ltd. (In
re Jackson Brook Institute, Inc.), 187 a district court relied on
§ 158(a)(3) to grant a mortgagor leave to appeal a bankruptcy court
order refusing to abstain or remand the mortgagor's foreclosure ac-
tion against the debtor.' 88 The primary issue on appeal was whether
the foreclosure action was a core or noncore proceeding, and thus
whether the bankruptcy judge could enter a judgment in the matter. 89
The court adopted a pragmatic approach to using § 1292(b) as a sub-
stitute standard, noting courts' liberal attitude toward bankruptcy ap-
peals in general. 190 In applying the § 1292(b) criteria, the court found
that when the issue on appeal is whether a bankruptcy court's ruling
relates to a core or noncore proceeding, interim appeal is appropriate
due to the sustained injury litigants will suffer over time if forced to
abide by orders entered by a judge who lacks jurisdiction in the
proceeding.' 91
A Southern District of New York court has also cited Williams ap-
provingly.' 92 In Mishkin v. Ageloff, the court granted corporate insid-
ers accused of causing the debtor's collapse leave to appeal from a
bankruptcy court's order granting the Trustee relief from an automatic
stay of discovery to avoid undue prejudice. 9 3 The court reversed the
bankruptcy judge's order because the Trustee had not sustained its
statutory burden of showing "particularized discovery" necessary to
avoid undue prejudice.'94 In finding that it had jurisdiction to hear
the appeal, the court expressly praised the Williams decision and its
rejection of the automatic adoption of the § 1292(b) standard. 95 To
support its approach, the court referenced the doctrine of flexible fi-
nality and extended the policy behind that doctrine to interlocutory
186. Id.
187. 227 B.R. 569 (D. Me. 1998).
188. See id. at 572-73. The bankruptcy judge determined that the foreclosure action
was a "core" proceeding against objection by the appellant. See id. at 573.
189. See id. at 583-86.
190. See id. at 581-82 ("This Court will thus analyze the appealability of the Bank-
ruptcy Order in this case using the factors set out in section 1292(b) to guide its analy-
sis while adopting the pragmatic and liberal approach required in determining the
appealability of an interlocutory order in a bankruptcy proceeding.").
191. See id. at 582 (citing In re Williams, 215 B.R. 289, 299 (D.R.I. 1997), appeal
dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999)).
192. See Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
193. Id. at 787-89.
194. Id. at 789-90 (reaching this conclusion required interpretation of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995's automatic stay provision, which is a matter
of non-bankruptcy law). The district court also granted motions to withdraw the ref-
erence from the bankruptcy court. See id. at 801.
195. See id. at 790-91 (noting that no court of appeals has precisely addressed the
propriety of using § 1292(b) in the context of the current version of § 158(a)(3)).
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appeals.'9 6 Mishkin also noted that the Second Circuit has "indicated
that its appellate jurisdiction is more limited than the district courts
vis- -vis bankruptcy appeals."'197 While not rejecting the use of
§ 1292(b) in other factual contexts, the court looked elsewhere for au-
thority to hear the appeal, implying that the order did not qualify
under § 1292(b). The court held that appeal was warranted because
the order involved an important question of interpretation of a non-
bankruptcy statute and raised issues that were of apparent first im-
pression.19s In addition, because the court was withdrawing the refer-
ence simultaneously with granting appellant's requested relief, appeal
was appropriate under the circumstances before it.199
Other courts have also exercised a more flexible approach to a
§ 158(a)(3) appeal. In Moix-McNutt v. Coop (In re Moix-McNuu),2co
a BAP granted a debtor leave to appeal due to the unique procedural
posture of the case.201 The appeal concerned the denial of a recusal
motion pursuant to appellant's accusation of gender bias against the
bankruptcy judge. 2 Denials of recusal motions are generally consid-
ered nonfinal. 3 The court declined to apply the § 1292(b) standard
in determining whether or not to hear the appeal: "Given our broad
discretion over interlocutory orders, we are not constrained to follow
the standards established for the courts of appeals. ' '20" The court
found that if it were to require appellant to await entry of a final or-
der, it might later be forced to vacate all subsequent orders should the
charge of bias be proved.20 5
Similarly, in Maquoketa State Bank v. Hayes (In re Hayes Bank-
ruptcy),2' a district court stated that the application of § 1292(b) in
lieu of the absence of a statutory standard under § 158(a)(3) "arise[s]
from a felt necessity to impose an analytical structure on the... in-
196. See id. at 791.
197. Id The court stated that this acknowledgment by the Second Circuit: "sup-
ports adoption of a standard... for determining whether to hear discretionary ap-
peals which takes into account this broader jurisdiction and which is not automatically
tied to a standard that is designed to limit, in a different context, the number of ap-
peals to the Court of Appeals." Id
198. See id. at 791 n.5.
199. See it Interestingly, the Second Circuit has held that the "mere presence of a
disputed issue that is a question of first impression, standing alone, is insufficient to
demonstrate a substantial ground for difference of opinion [under § 1292(b)]." Flor v.
BOT Fim. Corp. (In re Flor), 79 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1996).
200. 215 B.R. 405 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997).
201. See id at 408.
202. See id at 407. The bankruptcy judge allegedly referred to appellant as "just a
housewife" and "just a babysitter" during the proceedings, but the appellate court
found these allegations to be false. See id. at 409.
203. See id at 407-08.
204. Id at 408 n.6.
205. See id at 408 n.7 ("We would rather undo a few stitches at the outset than
unravel the entire garment.").
206. 220 B.R. 57 (N.D. Iowa 1998).
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quiry and to discourage pell-mell appeals."2 °7 Although the court de-
clined to hear creditor-appellants' appeal from an order refusing to
convert a Chapter 13 case to a Chapter 7 case, 0 8 it noted that nothing
in the "statutory or constitutional relationship between district and
bankruptcy courts" indicates a limit on the district court's discretion in
this area.20 9 The court instead pointed to the structural relationship
between the two courts as evidence of district courts' power.2 10 Be-
cause bankruptcy courts are units of the district courts, the court rea-
soned, and because district courts have the power to confer
jurisdiction upon, and to withdraw it from, bankruptcy courts, it fol-
lows that district courts should be able to review bankruptcy decisions
as freely as they review their own.211
These cases demonstrate the many compelling arguments for a
more flexible, pragmatic approach to hearing interlocutory appeals
from bankruptcy court orders in some procedural and factual con-
texts. These arguments draw on the plenary authority that district
courts exercise over bankruptcy courts,2t2 the doctrine of flexible fi-
nality as a reflection of a more lenient attitude toward appeals in the
bankruptcy context,213 injury to litigants resultant from abiding by or-
ders relating to matters in which the bankruptcy judge lacks jurisdic-
tion,214 matters of first impression, especially as to non-bankruptcy
issues, 1 5 the chance of an unclear record if the case is transferred to
the district court for trial, 16 the potential that a later reversal of the
order sought to be appealed will negate all prior orders,217 and the
207. Id. at 59.
208. See id. at 62-63 (finding that denial of a motion to convert a Chapter 13 case
into a Chapter 7 case is nonfinal because creditors' recovery will be secured by the
debtor's future income, rather than from the debtor's property, and thus no prejudice
arises). The court went on to deny leave to appeal under § 158(a)(3) because in effect
the creditors had shown no injury, and could appeal once the Chapter 13 Plan was
confirmed. Id. at 62-63.
209. Id. at 59.
210. See id.
211. See id. But see American Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 61 B.R. 678, 682-83
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (observing that even though bankruptcy courts are units of the district
courts, and that theoretically discretion to hear interlocutory appeals is greater than
that available to the courts of appeals, district courts should not avail themselves of
this more liberal discretion).
212. See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289, 298 n.6 (D.R.I.
1997), appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999); In re
Hayes Bankruptcy, 220 B.R. at 59.
213. See Foreign Car Ctr., Inc. v. Salem Suede, Inc. (In re Salem Suede, Inc.), 221
B.R. 586, 597-600 (D. Mass. 1998).
214. See BancBoston Real Estate Capital Corp. v. JBI Assocs. Ltd. (In re Jackson
Brook Inst., Inc.), 227 B.R. 569, 582 (D. Me. 1998).
215. See Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 791 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
216. See In re Salem Suede, Inc. 221 B.R. at 600-01.
217. See Moix-McNutt v. Coop (In re Moix-McNutt), 215 B.R. 405, 408 n.7 (B.A.P.
8th Cir. 1997).
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extended period of time often involved in bankruptcy proceedings."' 8
These arguments stand opposed by courts' need for facility and cer-
tainty in deciding which interlocutory appeals merit appellate re-
view.2 19 Against this background of disagreement over the correct
approach that district courts and BAPs should take when encounter-
ing bankruptcy interlocutory appeals, part IV argues that while an ap-
propriate analysis properly begins with § 1292(b), the statute should
be applied in a more flexible, pragmatic manner in the bankruptcy
context.
IV. TOWARD A MORE FLEXIBLE STANDARD
The concerns of bankruptcy litigants can be unique: the ability to
resolve and regulate their respective financial positions as expedi-
tiously as possible is paramount."2 Delay in final adjudication of
rights, or loss of the ability to contest a ruling, can be economically
disastrous to debtors and creditors. Courts developed the flexible ap-
proach to finality in bankruptcy in part to respond to these issues. t21
The doctrine functions to render many decisions automatically appeal-
able that would otherwise qualify as interlocutory, and thus be subject
to discretionary review.' Although bankruptcy litigants benefit from
the flexible finality doctrine, it alone is not enough to protect litigants
seeking to appeal purely interlocutory matters that do not qualify for
appeal under that doctrine.
In addition, exceptions to the finality doctrine, and other ap-
proaches that have been suggested to fill § 158(a)(3)'s void, cannot
adequately protect litigants' rights. The collateral order doctrine ap-
plies to a small class of prejudgment orders that finally determine
claims of right collateral to the primary cause of action.' z The re-
quirement voiced by many courts that appellants demonstrate "excep-
tional circumstances" to warrant interim appeal is only another way of
requiring a heightened showing in keeping with § 1292(b).1 4 The
abuse-of-discretion standard voiced in In re Executive Office Centers,
218. See Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289,299 (D.R.I. 1997),
appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999); In re Jackson
Brook InsL, Inc, 227 B.R. at 582.
219. See supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
220. See John F. Lomax, Jr., Future Electric Utility Bankruptcies: Are They on the
Horizon and What Can We Learn from Public Service Co. of New Hampshire's Expe-
rience?, 12 Bankr. Dev. J. 535, 566 (1996).
221. See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., United States Lines, Inc. v. American S.S. Owners Mut. Protection &
Indem. Assoc. (In re United States Lines, Inc.), 199 B.R. 465, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(stating that the conditions satisfying § 1292(b) will exist only in "exceptional
circumstances").
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Inc.,225 is yet another onerous requirement that aims to weed out all
but a few interlocutory appeals.
In resolving the concerns of bankruptcy litigants, this Note does not
advocate a wholesale discretionary approach to hearing interlocutory
appeals from bankruptcy courts; indeed, such an approach would be
unwise. The general judicial reluctance to entertain interlocutory ap-
peals, reflected in Congress's enactment of § 1292(b), is sound: avoid-
ing piecemeal review ordinarily saves litigants and the courts time and
money.226 In addition, if litigation proceeds uninterrupted, disputed
rulings may lose their significance, or cases may settle.22 7 Despite the
policies weighing against interim appeals,2 2 8 bankruptcy interlocutory
appeals should not be limited by rote application of § 1292(b) in all
situations.
Section 1292(b) provides a useful starting point for assessing ap-
peals in the absence of a specific statutory standard in the bankruptcy
context, as it reflects the legislative posture disfavoring piecemeal re-
view.229 A more flexible, pragmatic approach to hearing interlocutory
appeals in bankruptcy, however, can ensure that litigants' economic
needs will be emphasized.23° Such a reasoned, reflective approach
would be grounded in, but not limited by, § 1292(b), and would high-
light the unique characteristics of bankruptcy cases and proceed-
ings.23' Thus, a district court confronting a bankruptcy interlocutory
225. In re Executive Office Ctrs., Inc., 75 B.R. 60, 61 (E.D. La. 1987); see supra
note 167 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
227. See Joseph Mitzel, Note, When Is an Order Final?: A Result-Oriented Ap-
proach to the Finality Requirement for Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal Circuit Courts,
74 Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1341 n.20 (1990).
228. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text; see also Williams v. United
States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289, 298 n.6 (D.R.I. 1997), appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d
86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999) (observing that "while strict adherence to
the § 1292(b) procedures comports with sound policy, the language of § 158(a)(3) ob-
viously vests broader discretion in the district courts to permit interlocutory ap-
peals"); American Nat'l Bank v. Huff (In re Huff), 61 B.R. 678, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(noting that while district courts may properly hear interlocutory appeals when circuit
courts may not, and that policy reasons may compel the district court to do so, re-
-straint should be exercised in order to limit piecemeal review).
230. For example, commentators have urged that courts of appeals, in considering
whether to hear interlocutory appeals from district court rulings on bankruptcy ap-
peals, should consider "[t]he special needs and opportunities created by bankruptcy
procedure." 16 Wright & Miller, supra note 48, § 3926.1, at 256.
231. See, e.g., Cuevas, supra note 133, at 23 (stating, in the context of corporate
reorganization, that appeals from interlocutory rulings are "consequential[, and]
therefore, the district court should be more liberal in granting leave to appeal than in
the context of traditional civil litigation"). Cuevas lists the following factors that dis-
trict courts should consider: whether the appeal involves an issue central to the cor-
porate reorganization; whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretion;
whether the order conflicts with controlling precedent; hardship to the litigants and
other parties; and whether appellate review will advance or impede the termination of
the reorganization. See id.
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appeal should appropriately consider the general judicial reluctance to
entertain disruptive, time-consuming appeals in the midst of litigation,
as reflected by § 1292(b)'s stringent criteria, but should ultimately
base its decision on whether to hear the appeal on the particular set of
circumstances before it. When encountering bankruptcy orders that
do not meet § 1292(b)'s three-pronged test, the appellate court should
consider whether the heavy economic burdens of bankruptcy litigants
or the procedural peculiarities of bankruptcy litigation merit permis-
sion to appeal nonetheless.
As set forth in part I, commentators have criticized a rigid applica-
tion of § 1292(b)'s criteria even in the context of appeals from district
courts to courts of appeals."3 These authorities focus on the pitfalls
of a strict reading of § 1292(b), which can foreclose litigants' ability to
protect their rights. 33 Among the arguments advanced for a more
flexible reading of § 1292(b) include the need to clarify issues that fre-
quently fail to reach the appellate level, the opportunity to save costs
and time, the ability of courts of appeals to more closely supervise
district courts, and the fact that complex litigation can move forward
while discrete issues are dealt with on appeal.3 Several of these fac-
tors are especially compelling in the bankruptcy context. The prece-
dential value of district court rulings, though limited, can create
greater consistency in the patchwork of bankruptcy law535 Because
bankruptcy courts are non-Article III courts that function as units of
the district courts,2 6 the freedom of district courts to closely supervise
bankruptcy litigation and to grant leave to appeal, particularly in
noncore proceedings, is crucial to the rights of litigants3 7 In addition,
because heightened economic interests are frequently at stake, the
ability to afford a party relief by hearing an appeal that may expedite
the litigation or to adjust the financial relationships between the par-
ties is paramount. It makes little sense, therefore, for courts that are
not statutorily constrained by § 1292(b) to insist on a literal, automatic
application of its standard in determining whether to grant leave to
appeal3 8
232. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d Cir. 1974) ("Tbe determination of what orders are prop-
erly reviewable under § 1292(b) must be made by a practical application of those
policies [favoring interlocutory appeals], not by a mechanical application of labels
234. See supra note 58.
235. See supra note 146.
236. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
237. See BancBoston Real Estate Capital Corp. v. JBI Assocs. Ltd. (In re Jackson
Brook Inst., Inc.), 227 B.R. 569, 582 (D. Me. 1998).
238. One criticism of the current statutory structure concerns both the ability and
the availability of the district courts to properly adjudicate bankruptcy appeals. The
argument is that district judges, who have more pressing matters on their dockets and
limited expertise in bankruptcy law, provide bankruptcy litigants with limited oppor-
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The application of § 1292(b) in the bankruptcy context should in-
volve a balancing of the "probable gains and losses of immediate ap-
peal. '2 3 9 A flexible approach to using § 1292(b) would engage in such
a weighing process based on the factual and procedural circumstances
of each litigation, departing from that standard when necessary to pre-
vent undue injury to litigants' economic interests. Examples of situa-
tions in which denial of leave to appeal is likely to be proper include:
fact-intensive inquiries, 240 such as denial of a debtor's reorganization
plan241 or adequacy of representation of parties' interests;242 orders
remaining subject to change below (e.g., grants of summary judgment
in multi-party, multi-claim proceedings that have not been certified as
entries of final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b)); 243 proceedings in which appeal will likely lead to protracted
delay due to chance of further appeal, especially when likelihood of
trial is high anyway; 244 when further factual determinations below may
affect the question of law sought to be reviewed;245 and routine dis-
covery orders.246
On the other hand, examples of situations in which immediate ap-
peal may be warranted include: threat of prolonged injury over the
tunity for a full and fair determination of the issues. See Crabb, supra note 1, at 145.
Bankruptcy appeals currently constitute a very small portion of the district court
docket, however, see id at 147, and matters that most warrant review are often non-
bankruptcy issues. See, e.g., Mishkin, 220 B.R. at 791-92 & n.5 (interpreting the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act).
239. United States Trustee v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit Corp.), 99 B.R.
762, 768 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
240. See, e.g., In re Harken, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 98-3820, 1999 WL 64955, at *2 (E.D.
La. Feb. 5, 1999) (denying leave to appeal a denial of a motion for summary judgment
because factual matters were at issue).
241. See In re MCorp Fin., Inc., 139 B.R. 820, 823 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (noting that the
denial of a reorganization plan involves a fact-intensive inquiry best left to the discre-
tion of the bankruptcy judge).
242. See, e.g., Elliot Assocs. v. LTV Corp., 71 B.R. 251, 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (deny-
ing leave to appeal an order refusing to establish a Public Debt Committee to repre-
sent interests of public debtholders).
243. See, e.g., Boylan v. George E. Bumpus, Jr. Constr. Co. (In re Bumpus), 226
B.R. 724, 725-26 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) (denying leave to appeal an entry of summary
judgment against plaintiffs suing a debtor on claims of breach of contract and breach
of fiduciary duty).
244. See, e.g., Trustee of Jartran, Inc. v. Winston & Strawn, 208 B.R. 898, 901-02
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (denying leave to appeal the denial of summary judgment motion).
Note that declining to grant leave to appeal when protracted delay may result is dif-
ferent from requiring that the appeal materially advance the litigation.
245. See, e.g., Turner v. New York Hospital (In re Moskowitz), 14 B.R. 307, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (refusing leave to appeal the denial of motion to dismiss where "dis-
puted questions of fact... remain[ed] open").
246. See, e.g., American Freight Sys., Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co. (In re American
Freight Sys., Inc.), 194 B.R. 659, 662 (D. Kan. 1996) (denying leave to appeal a denial
of request for a protective order because the appellants failed to demonstrate that the
bankruptcy order differed materially from routine discovery orders).
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course of the bankruptcy proceedings;24 7 the existence of questions as
to the bankruptcy court's power to issue a ruling;248 the potential for
reversal of all subsequent orders if the order sought to be appealed
from is later reversed;24 9 when the case is likely to be transferred for
trial and the record is at risk of being confusing or unclear;' when
the issue is whether an order relates to a core or noncore matter, with
preference given to granting appeal of noncore rulings;251 matters of
first impression; 2 when the reference is being withdrawn; 3 and
when length of the bankruptcy proceedings is likely to render chance
of success on appeal highly unlikely, as in venue orders. - 4
These examples illustrate the unique circumstances that mark bank-
ruptcy litigation, and provide but a few instances in which a flexible
approach to granting leave to appeal may be warranted. The ability of
district courts and BAPs to approach bankruptcy interlocutory ap-
peals flexibly is provided by § 158(a)(3); the decision to do so should
be governed by pragmatism, necessity, and justice.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy laws regulate the operation of businesses. Clarity of
legal rules and expeditious resolution of litigated issues are crucial not
only to the parties in any given case or proceeding, but to those en-
247. See, e.g., Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289, 299-300
(D.R.I. 1997), appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999)
(granting leave to appeal attorney sanctions that could lead to reputational injury).
248. See, e.g., Back v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 213 B.R. 633, 636-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting leave to appeal, under the criteria of § 1292(b), a bank-
ruptcy court's entering of a preliminary injunction against a state-court action against
the debtor, but denying leave to appeal the denial of motions to dismiss).
249. See, e.g., Moix-McNutt v. Coop (In re Moix-McNutt), 215 B.R. 405, 408 & n.7
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (granting leave to appeal the denial of a recusal motion where
the debtor charged the bankruptcy judge with gender bias).
250. See, e.g., Foreign Car Ctr., Inc. v. Salem Suede, Inc. (In re Salem Suede, Inc.),
221 B.R. 586, 600-01 (D. Mass. 1998) (granting leave to appeal the denial of summary
judgment due to the bankruptcy judge's failure to clarify the material issues of fact
that remained).
251. See, eg., BancBoston Real Estate Capital Corp. v. JBI Assocs. Ltd. (In re
Jackson Brook Inst., Inc.), 227 B.R. 569, 582 (D. Me. 1998) (noting that if a bank-
ruptcy judge's erroneous ruling on a noncore matter is left intact, the parties are
"threatened with the continuing injury of orders being entered over a long period of
time by a court that lacks jurisdiction").
252. See, e.g., Mishkin v. Ageloff, 220 B.R. 784, 791 n-5 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (allowing
leave to appeal an order granting the Trustee relief from an automatic stay of discov-
ery, when interpretation of non-bankruptcy law was required).
253. See id. at 795 (noting that withdrawal of the reference is mandatory when mat-
ters raised in "proceedings or claims require 'significant interpretation, as opposed to
simple application' of non-bankruptcy federal law" (quoting City of New York v. Ex-
xon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991)).
254. See, eg., ICMR, Inc. v. Tri-City Foods, Inc., 100 B.R. 51, 53-54 (D. Kan. 1989)
(stating that courts should have discretion to permit interlocutory appeals of orders
changing venue where there is a small chance of success if appeal is taken after the
bankruptcy case has closed).
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gaged in commercial planning and development. The nature of bank-
ruptcy litigation, which affects multiple parties' interests, involves
large amounts of money, and often lasts for years, has led to the devel-
opment of the flexible finality doctrine. Under this doctrine, orders
become appealable as of right in more instances than they would in
non-bankruptcy litigation. But a flexible approach to final rulings
does not necessitate an overly strict approach to interlocutory rulings
as a form of judicial over-correction. Flexibility is appropriate even in
the interlocutory context to serve the unique interests of bankruptcy
litigants.
In confronting a request for leave to appeal from a bankruptcy
court's interim ruling, district courts and BAPs should weigh the
"probable gains and losses of immediate appeal,"2-" carefully consid-
ering the potential prejudice to appellants if forced to await a final
ruling. In adopting § 1292(b) as a surrogate standard, courts should
take a pragmatic, flexible approach to its use, and view § 1292(b) as a
springboard, not a straightjacket. The decision to adopt § 1292(b) as a
stand-in for § 158(a)(3)'s absence of criteria is, after all, "jurispruden-
tial and not jurisdictional."256
255. United States Trustee v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit Corp.), 99 B.R.
762, 768 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
256. Williams v. United States (In re Williams), 215 B.R. 289, 298 n.6 (D.R.I. 1997),
appeal dismissed, 156 F.3d 86 (1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 905 (1999).
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